C-RANDALL   2774 
R»B»R. 


#3*1 


Duke  University  Libraries 

Speech  of  Mr.  J 
Conf  Pam  12mo  #381 

DcH073llfl3D 


SPEECH 


Me,  JOHNSON  OF  ARKANSAS, 


IN  THE 


C.  S.  SEMTE,  FEBRUARY  9th,  1864, 


ON 


THE  BILL  TO  LIMIT  AND  DEFINE 


THE 


TERMS   OF   OFFICE 


OF  THE 


PRINCIPAL  OFFICEBS  OR  HEADS  OF  DEPARTMENTS. 


RICHMOND: 

JAMES  E.  GOODE,  PRINTER. 

1864. 


DUKE 

UNIVERSITY 

LIBRARY 


Treasure  'Room 


/       '    -,  I A 

SPEECH. 


Mr.  President  : 

The  bill  under  consideration  proposes  to  enact — 

"  That  the  term  of  office  of  the  secretary  or  principal  officer  of  each 
one  of  the  several  executive  departments,  shall  be  for  the  same  period 
of  time  as  that  of  a  member  of  the  house  of  representatives,  and  shall 
expire  at  the  end  of  each  congress  of  the  Confederate  States ;  but  that 
the  same  officer  may  be  renominated,  and  shall  be  competent,  if  con- 
firmed, to  occupy  and  to  enjoy  the  rights  and  to  discharge  the  duties  of 
said  office  for  any  number  of  terms." 

There  are  those  in  the  legislative  and  in  the  executive  departments 
of  our  government,  whose  opinions  are  justly  entitled  to  great  weight, 
who  contend  that  this  bill  is  contrary  to  the  constitution,  and  who  avow 
"the  spirit  of  the  constitution"  as  the  rule  of  construction,  by  which 
they  attain  this  conclusion,  though  that  instrument  is  itself  silent.  If 
this  be  a  sound  and  safe  rule  of  construction,  it  remains  for  examina- 
tion to  determine  whether,  in  this  instance,  it  is  well  and  justly  applied. 

The  bill  limits  the  term  of  office  of  a  secretary  to  two  years,  and  this 
limitation  involves  a  new  appointment  or  a  renomination,  which  in  its 
constitutional  course  must  be  submitted  to  the  senate,  where  it  may  be 
confirmed  or  rejected.  This  renomination,  it  is  objected,  creates  an  ac- 
countability on  the  part  of  the  secretary  biennially  to  the  senate,  which  is 
a  part  of  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government ;  and  thus  is  in- 
fringed, by  a  co-ordinate  branch  of  government,  the  control  of  the  pre- 
sident over  his  cabinet  officers.  To  say  that  an  accountability  is  thus 
created  is  not  strictly  correct.  The  officer  renominated  is  not  required 
to  render  an  account  of  his  acts  ;  no  penalty  is  inflicted  or  proposed  to 
be  inflicted  upon  him.  When  his  term  has  expired,  he  is  out  of  office. 
The  action  of  the  senate  has  no  relation  to  the  past.  It  relates  exclu- 
sively to  the  fitness  and  qualifications  of  the  nominee  for  the  duties  of 
the  office  in  future  ;  and  if  the  conduct  and  action  of  the  officer  during 
a  previous  term  is  referred  to  by  the  senate,  it  is  not  by  way  of  inflict- 
ing any  penalty,  but  it  is  referred  to  simply  as  the  best  means  to  form 
their  own  judgment,  so  that  they  may  discharge  wisely  their  own  duty 
in  regard  Xo  confirmation  or  rejection,  and  to  this  no  objection  can  weil 
be  taken. 

That  the  limitation  of  office  infringes  the  control  of  the  president 
over  his  cabinet  officer,  where  that  control  is  sought  to  be  exercised  for 
acy  laudable  or  patriotic  purpose,  is  not  well  founded.     If  the  control 


yibZHb 


is  for  purposes  of  usurpation,  or  is  otherwise  pernicious,  destructive  or 
criminal,  then  all  will  agree  that  to  that  extent  this  control  ought  to  be 
abridged ;  and  any  action  producing  that  effect,  we  may  feel  assured,  no 
one  will  contend  is  an  infringement,  such  as  is  embraced  in  the  "spirit" 
of  the  objection.  To  contend  for  a  corrupt  executive  control  by  the 
"spirit  of  the  constitution,"  would  pervert  the  constitutional  intent  and 
would  betray  the  spirit  of  the  paid  advocate  employed  by  a  criminal  at 
the  bar,  and  not  the  candid  debater  and  statesman,  who  seeks  for  truth 
and  prefers  it  to  a  meretricious  victory.  If  the  control  is  for  a  merito- 
rious purpose,  the  president's  power  is  ample  to  compel  concurrence  or 
to  remove  the  officer. 

That  this  limitation  can  produce  no  other  infringement  of  control,  and 
that  it  is  not  prohibited  by  the  constitution,  I  cite  as  proofs  the  words 
of  the  instrument  itself,  which  declares  in  article  2,  section  2,  para- 
graph 3, that 

"The  principal  officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments,  and  all 
persons  connected  with  the  diplomatic  service,  may  be  removed  from 
office  at  the  pleasure  of  the  president."  It  will  be  seen  by  this  that  the 
right  of  removal,  which  is  the  means  of  control  by  the  president,  is  not 
invaded.  He  can  remove  "  at  pleasure"  the  officer  for  two  years  as 
well  as  the  officer  for  life.  The  control  is  perfect  for  all  laudable  pur- 
poses, and  may  be  exercised  daily  and  new  officers  appointed.  The 
secretary  knows  he  is  subject  to  it  at  any  hour  and  for  any  cause,  not 
even  excepting  whim  and  caprice.  For  all  wholesome  purposes  the  con- 
trol is  even  increased,  for  by  force  of  the  expiration  of  the  term  of 
office,  the  president  is  compelled  periodically,  even  though  not  so  in- 
clined, to  pass  his  judgment  upon  the  officer,  and  the  officer  must  ever 
look  upon  renomination  as  necessary  by  the  president,  before  reconfirma- 
tion by  the  senate  can  come  in  question  ;  and  will  ever  feel  that  removal 
is  imminent,  that  he  is  specially  subject  to  the  president  whilst  a  denial 
of  confirmation  by  the  senate  is  remote  and  is  dependent :  first,  upon 
the  expiration  of  the  term  of  service  ;  and  second,  upon  the  will  of  the 
president  to  renominate  ;  and  thirdly,  upon  the  authority  of  the  presi- 
dent, the  strength  of  his  party,  the  merit  of  the  officer,  and  other  causes 
tending  to  influence  the  mind  of  the  senate,  and  to  render  uncertain 
any  adverse  decision. 

It  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  the  senate  will  act  factiously  upon  cabi- 
net nominations.  Experience  of  seventy  years  has  not  shown  it  to  be 
so.  Mr.  Hamilton  says,  speaking  of  the  act  of  rejection  by  the  senate  : 
"It  can  only  be  to  make  place  for  another  nomination  by  himself,  (the 
president.)  The  person  ultimately  appointed  must  be  the  object  of  his 
preference,  though  perhaps  not  in  the  first  degree.  It  is  also  not  pro- 
bable that  his  nomination  would  often  be  overruled.  The  senate  could 
not  be  tempted,  by  the  preference  they  might  feel  to  another,  to  reject 
the  one  proposed.  They  could  not  assure  themselves  that  the  person 
they  might  wish  would  be  brought  forward  by  a  second  or  any  subse- 
quent nomination.  They  could  not  be  certain  that  a  future  nomination 
would  present  a  candidate  in  any  degree  more  acceptable  to  them,  and 
as  their  dissent  might  cast  a  kind  of  stigma  upon  the  individual  re- 
jected, and  might  seem  to  reflect  upon  the  judgment  of  the  president ; 


it  is  not  likely  their  sanction  would  often  be  refused  when  there  were 
not  special  and  strong  reasons  for  the  refusal." 

Yet  further  in  speaking  of  that  power  of  the  senate  to  confirm  and 
reject  a  nomination.  Mr.  Hamilton  remarks,  that  "  it  would  have  a  power- 
ful though  in  general  a  silent  operation.  It  would  be  an  excellent  check 
upon  a  spirit  of  favoritism  in  the  president,  and  would  tend  greatly  to 
prevent  the  appointment  of  unfit  characters  from  state  prejudice,  from 
family  connection,  from  personal  attachment,  or  from  a  view  to  popu- 
larity.*' 

The  "powerful  though  in  general  silent"  influence  referred  to,  would 
relate  not  only  to  the  increased  solicitude  and  thoughtful  care  of  the 
president  in  the  selection  of  his  officers,  it  would  operate  effectively  upon 
their  energy  and  devotion  to  their  duties  when  in  office,  and  to  their  so- 
licitude to  discharge  those  duties  satisfactorily,  which  constitutes  the 
Strength  of  a  popular  government,  and  to  abate  all  gratuitous  rudeness, 
discourtesy  or  insulting  exhibition  of  authority,  which  goes  so  far  to 
render  a  people  unhappy  and  to  cripple  even  the  wisest  and  ablest  ad- 
ministration. Indeed,  the  arrogant,  inflated,  conceited,  tyrannical  and 
unnecessarily  insulting  demeanor  of  our  officers,  civil  as  well  as  military, 
humiliating  and  breaking  the  pride  and  spirit  of  our  people,  is  universally 
remarked.  It  is  the  evil  of  our  day.  and  it  exists  in  all  executive  cir- 
cle-, even  in  the  first  circle  of  chief  officers  around  the  president.  The 
only  remedy  for  it,  of  reasonable  efficacy  and  of  expanded  influence,  is 
the  example  of  those  higher  circles.  To  secure  the  heaven-born  exam- 
ple of  patient  courtesy  from  the  highest  functionaries,  limit  the  cer- 
tainty of  their  power. 

Under  the  old  constitution,  the  apprehension  of  the  federal  statesmen 
was  that  the  legislative  would  encroach  upon  the  executive  branch  of  the 
government.  It  was  not  so  however  with  the  states'  rights  party <  they 
feared  encroachment  by  the  executive.  Mr.  Hamilton  preferred  a  pre- 
sident for  life.  His  theory  was  overthroAvn  in  the  convention.  He 
then  defended  the  constitution  as  he  found  it,  except  that  in  accordance 
with  his  original  theory,  fearing  always  a  legislative  encroachment,  he 
and  his  party  spared  no  opportunity  to  denounce  the  danger  of  it,  and 
availed  themselves  of  all  means  and  at  e\cry  occasion,  whether  by  the 
enactment  of  measures,  or  by  rules  of  construction  upon  uncertain  or 
doubtful  clauses  of  the  constitution  of  general  significance,  to  fortify  the 
executive  power  and  to  strengthen  the  executive  arm.  These  facts  fur- 
nish an  important  mean  to  the  interpretation  and  proper  estimate  of 
his  vii 

It  is  somewhat  strange  now,  to  look  over  the  list  of  states'  rights  men 
in  and  out  of  c  who*  join  that  party  and  who  entertain  the  same 

suspicions  of  encroachment  by  the  legislative  upon  the  executive  branch 
of  government,  who  adopt  the  policy,  if  they  do  not  take  their  in- 
spiration from  Alexander  Hamilton,  and  who  adopt  the  freedom  of  his 
rule's  of  construction  to  achieve  their  unfortunate  polic\',  and  that  too 
when  the  features  of  the  two  governments  are  so  widely  different  that 
it  may  be  regarded  as  tpestionable  to  say  the  least,  whether  Mr.  Ham- 
ilton, an  honest  and  conscientious  statesman,  if  he  were  now  here, 
would  not  himself,  as  a  lover  of  the  liberty  secured  by  representative 


6 

government,  have  repudiated -his  positions  in  the  case  of  the  United 
States  and  contended  for  additional  guards  against  the  executive,  now  so 
greatly  strengthened  and  in  favor  of  the  legislative,  now  so  seriously 
weakened,  in  fact,  as  well  as  relatively.  I  will  not  compliment  the  dis- 
tinguished apostles  of  Jefferson  and  Calhoun  for  this  startling  departure 
in  this  hour  of  darkness,  and  I  cannot  confide  in  and  cannot  follow 
them,  though  their  pathway  be  illuminated  by  a  great  northern  light. 
Neither  ought  they  to  suppose  that  the  great  alterations  which  have 
been  made  in  our  constitution  will  pass  unobserved  by  our  people,  nor 
that  the  votes  and  opinions,  in  which  they  indulge,  are  free  from  respon- 
sibility, nor  that  these  questions  will  not  ultimately  be  presented  and 
submitted  to  the  great  liberty  loving  and  conservative  democratic  heart 
of  the  southern  states.  I  will  trust  that  I  shall  be  able  to  show,  in  the 
course  of  these  remarks,  that  the  careful  and  well  tested  balance  hereto- 
fore existing  between  these  co-ordinate  and  coequal  branches  of  the 
government  has  been  seriously  disturbed  and  endangered  ;  though  by  no 
means  so  well  could  I  accomplish  it  as  these  sa,me  eloquent  and  able 
apostles,  could  they  emancipate  their  minds  from  a  most  singular  bewil- 
derment as  it  plainly  appears  to  my  humble  comprehension. 

That  any  accountability  for  a  mal-administration  is  created  by  this 
bill,  is  denied ;  that  any  interruption  to  the  power  of  the  president  over 
his  ministers,  to  dismiss  all  that  are  refractory,  and  to  surround  again 
his  council  board,  as  often  as  he  pleases,  with  such  only  as  are  of  his 
own  selection,  is  wdiolly  untrue  ;  or  that  any  influence  is  established  in- 
imical to  the  proper  and  useful  control  designed  to  be  secured  to  the 
president,  or  that*  is  calculated  to  override  the  wise  object  of  the  con- 
stitution, which  is  to  secure  to  the  people  the  best  possible  administra- 
tion, is  without  just  and  substantial  foundation. 

One- proposition,  illustrating  and  expounding  the  operation  of  the  bill 
before  us,  is  self-evident.  It  declares  that  a  corrupt,  tyrannical  or  in- 
competent minister,  or  a  great  and  unscrupulous  ambitious  statesman, 
shall  not  be  armed  with  great  powers,  and  inaugurated  with  high  office 
and  hold  it  for  life.  Those  who  oppose  this  bill  would  fasten  this  re- 
sult, so  repugnant  to  the  first  principles  of  free  government,Mupon  our 
constitution. 

If  there  is  any  rule  in  government,  which  the  freedom  of  man  inex- 
orable exacts,  and  which  has  been  canonized  by  every  philosopher,  and 
consecrated  in  every  written  code  or  constitution  by  every  eminent  law- 
giver, it  is  that  every  office,  which  is  the  exponent,  or  is  likely  to  be- 
come such,  of  real  power,  shall  be  limited  and  restricted  in  duration 
and  extent. 

If  this  bill  establishes  any  control  in  Vne  co-ordinate  legislative 
branch,  it  is  subordinate  wholly  to  that  of  the  president,  and  can  only 
be  with  justice  defined  as  being  a  healthy  influence.  It  proposes  only 
a  negative,  and  fixes  only  a  limit  of  time  beyond  which,  what  the  public 
may  condemn  as  incompetency,  may  cease  to  idiotize  in  office  to  the  de- 
triment of  a  nation,  and  tyranny  and  encroachment  may  cease  to  tram- 
ple upon  the  laws,  and  haughtily  to  float  in  the  faces  of  the  people  their 
inflated  official  robes.  Already,  in  the  brief  period  of  oiy  national  ex- 
istence, we  have  had  in  some  instances,  in  public  judgment,  too  little 


capacity  for  the  public  good,  with  too  much  of  conceit,  insult  and  annoy- 
ance for  patient  public  endurance,  united  in  all  likelihood,  as  is  natural 
to  such  qualities,  with  a  determined  love  for  office  and  power,  which 
could  alone  be  reached  and  cured  by  the  rigid  force  of  public  law. 

If  the  limitation  upon  the  duration  of  a  cabinet  officer,  as  proposed 
in  this  bill,  does  violence  to  the  spirit  of  the  constitution,  then  no  limi- 
tation can  be  imposed  by  law  upon  any  other  of  the  executive  officers. 
The  constitution  is  silent  as  to  the  duration  of  office  of  all  appointees  of 
the  president.  In  paragraph  2  of  section  2  of  article  2,  the  constitu- 
tion ordains  that  the  president  "  shall  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  ad- 
vice and  consent  of  the  senate,  shall  appoint  ambassadors  and  other  public 
ministers,  &c,  &c,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  Confederate  States, 
whose  appointments  are  not  herein  otherwise  provided  for,  and  tvhich 
shall  be  established  by  law;"  and  in  paragraph  3  of  section  2  article  2, 
it  is  declared  that  "  the  principal  officers  in  each  of  the  executive  de- 
partments, &c,  may  be  removed  from  office  at  the  pleasure  of  the  presi- 
dent. All  other  civil  officers  of  the  executive  departments  may  be  re- 
moved at  any  time  by  the  president,"  &c,  for  certain  eau 

The  power  is  given  to  establish  the  offices  of  secretary  of  state, 
treasury,  war,  &c,  and  the  full  power  to  affix  and  define  all  the  duties 
and  elements  requisite  or  usual,  which  enter  into  or  constitute  an  office, 
(and  of  which  the  length  of  term  is  one,)  without  other  reservation  or 
limitation  than  the  power  of  removal  by  the  president.  The  constitu- 
tion does  not  say  that  the  secretary  or  other  civil  officers  of  the  execu- 
tive department  shall  hold  office  at  the  pleasure  of  the  president ;  but 
it  does  say  that  the  secretaries  "may  be  removed  at  the  pleasure,"  and 
all  others  "at  any  time."  To  be  removed  "at  pleasure"  and  to  be  re- 
moved "at  any  time"  is  the  same  thing;  and  it  seems  a  fair  inference 
if  the  legislative  power  establishing  both  classes  cannot  affix  the  con- 
stituent of  duration  in  one  class,  then  it  cannot  in  the  other,  and  as  the 
constitution  is  silent  except  for  removal,  no  limitation  is  lawful. 

It  may  be  argued  in  the  case  of  the  class  of  officers  to  be  removed 
"  at  any  time,"  that  the  causes  for  the  removal  of  that  class  have  been 
prescribed  as  "for  incapacity,  inefficiency,"  &c.,  and  that  a  material 
distinction  is  thus  declared  between  them  and  that  class  which  is  re- 
movable "at  pleasure."  This  is  certainly  true  in  some  particulars,  and 
it  may  not  be  improperly  inferred  from  the  specification  of  causes  of 
removal  in  one  class,  that  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  president  to  remove 
that  class  whenever  such  causes  exist;  and  it  maybe  plausibly  inferred 
in  those  cases  removable  "at  pleasure"  and  without  cause,  that  the 
question  of  removal  is  optional,  however  incapable  or  inefficient.  Now,' 
whether  such  retention  in  office  be  the  result  of  misjudgment  or  other 
cause,  if  incapacity  or  inefficiency  do  really  exist,  it  is  not  the  less  un- 
authorized and  deplorable.  But  to  infer  as  a  distinction,  that  because 
in  the  one  class  of  officers  the  authority  to  remove  requires  a  cause  for 
its  exercise,  and  is  thus  made  a  duty,  that  it  is  different  from  the  other 
class  and  may  be  limited  by  congress ;  whilst  in  the  other  class,  which 
is  removable  at  pleasure  and  requires  no  cause,  it  is  therefore  sanctified 
and  consecrated  to  executive  control,  even  to  abuse,  and  is  exalted 
above  the  power  of  legislative  limitation,  would  not  seem  to  be  logical- or 


8 

plausible.  The  natural  conclusion  must  be  that  the  legislature,  which 
was  specially  empowered  to  create  and  establish  both  classes  of  offices, 
can  attach  to  each  a  restricted  duration ;  otherwise,  our  system  is  one 
of  office  for  life,  of  irresponsibility,  and  of  a  thousand  despicable,  egotis- 
tical tyrants,  distributed  through  all  the -departments. 

The  questions  involved  are  of  a  consequence  neither  minor  nor  tran- 
sient— they  are  concurrent  and  coexistent  with  this  government. 

The  able  and  invaluable  report  of  the  judiciary  committee  by  the 
chairman,  (Mr.  Semmes,)  though  too  studiously  condensed  and  too  se- 
verely retrenched,  is  filled  with  evidences  of  thorough  research  and  in- 
dustrious examination,  and  has  brought  to  light  many  facts  and  much  of 
the  constitutional  learning  so  difficult  to  attain  by  the  ordinary  student. 
He  has  discussed  the  subject  with  enlarged  views,  as  well  as  a  close  logi- 
cal reasoning,  well  calculated  to  remove  all  doubts  from  his  theory  of 
the  power  and  true  intent  of  the  constitution.  Previous  to  the  presen- 
tation of  that  report,  I  awaited,  I  confess,  with  some  anxiety  and  per- 
haps apprehension,  the  results  of  discussion,  knowing  as  I  did,  the 
assured  positiveness  of  the  opponents  of  the  bill  upon  constitutional 
grounds.  I  am  now  satisfied,  from  the  facts  and  history,  precedents 
and  early  opinions,  constituting  special  learning  in  this  connection,  and 
by  the  admirable  argument  of  the  senator,  that  there  is  no  just  founda- 
tion of  constitutional  objection  ;  and  if  I  am  now  engaged  in  continuing 
this  discussion,  it  is  not  that  I  feel  it  to  be  essential,  but  as  the  author 
of  the  measure,  I  feel  it  to  be  my  duty,  however  unwelcome  the  labor  or 
unpleasant  the  task. 

If  the  opponents  of  the  measure,  who  have  resisted  it  so  promptly 
and  confidently,  are  unable  to  demonstrate,  even  to  palpability,  their 
constitutional  moorings,  they  must  abandon  the  contest.  They  are 
patriots  and  republicans,  and  surely  will  not  attempt  to  fasten  upon  us, 
from  any  obligation  less  imposing  than  the  constitution,  a  system  so 
odious  to  freemen  as  that  by  which  all  offices  are  to  be  held  for  life  and 
at  the  pleasure  of  all  future  chief  magistrates. 

If  it  be  so  determined,  then  we  have  made  a  fearful  step  backwards, 
and  it  involves  another  revolution,  which  I  do  not  hesitate  to  predict. 
Neither  can  I  believe  that  this  act,  after  the  constitutional  objection  is 
given  up,  will  be  resisted  by  congress  or  the  executive,  on  the  ground 
that  the  doctrine  of  life  office  is  expedient  even  as  to  the  heads  of  de- 
partments. 

Our  affairs  are  the  subject  of  too  much  anxious  thought  to  hesitate  to 
speak  the  whole  truth.  Public  confidence  in  the  cabinet  of  the  president 
is  shaken,  and  with  many  it  is  lost.  The  whole  burden  of  this  adminis- 
tration rests  on  the  president.  Persistently  now  the  public  turns  to  him; 
the  expression  is  common  that  some  of  the  cabinet  are  incapable  for 
more  than  mere  clerks,  and  such  is  their  proper  sphere  forneed  of  judge- 
ment, foresight,  and  practical  sense.  The  situation  is  one  of  evil  promise 
and  of  public  anxiety,  and  it  is  proper  that  it  be  discussed.  Upon  the 
president  alone  rests  the  whole  weight  of  this  administration,  and  through 
him  exists  the  bond  of  confidence  with  the  people ;  and  unsupported  as 
he  is,  the  public  strictures,  censure  and  reproach  are  passing  by  the  in- 
competent subordinates,  where  they  are  properly  due,  to  be  thrown  in 


magazine  at  his  doors.  His  strength  among  both  the  people  and  the 
army  is  essential  to  our  success.  Yet  we  all  know  that  these  things  are 
undermining  his  strength,  and  we  cannot  in  discharging  our  duty  honest- 
ly, hesitate  to  say  them  to  him ;  nor  do  I  feel  apprehension  or  doubt 
that  he  has  that  magnanimity  of  soul  which  can  prefer  a  candid  opinion, 
however  unwelcome,  if  candidly  and  courteously,  and  not  malevolently 
expressed. 

The  difficulty  with  the  cabinet  demands  a  remedy ;  it  is  great  in  its 
influence  and  easily  remedied.  If  they  or  any  of  them  have  lost  the 
coiffidcnce  of  the  public,  they  ought  to  be  subjected  to  some  further 
test.  It  cannot  be,  if  rejected,  that  there  are  none  others  capable  of 
their  places.  If  so  subjected,  those  will  be  rejected  only  who  ought  to 
be.  But  let  them  all  be  reconfirmed,  at  which  I  should  not  be  surprised, 
and  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  such  action  will  show  to  the  public  the 
continued  confidence  of  the  senate,  who  have  the  best  of  all  opportunities 
to  judge  fully  and  wisely,  and  it  will  greatly  stimulate  them  and  strengthen 
the  government  and  confirm  the  public  confidence. 

This  appeal  to  the  "  spirit  of  the  constitution  "  is  intended  to  defeat 
the  pending  bill,  and  is  to  guarantee  the  inviolability  of  the  cabinet  offi- 
cers— the  highest  officers  in  government  next  to  the  president ;  and  after 
having  enthralled  them  and  declared  them  to  be  mere  "  tenants  at  ivM" 
to  confer  upon  them  by  decision  of  the  whole  congress,  office  for  life 
and  immunity  from  all  liability  to  lose  it,  by  incompetency,  dishonesty, 
usurpation  or  other  cause,  except  the  whim  or  judgment  of  a  partial 
master. 

It  is  fashionable  whilst  defending  thia  class,  to  depreciate  their  power 
and  importance.  Nothing  can  be  more  mistaken  or  unjust.  They  are 
now  far  more  powerful  than  judges,  senators  or  congressmen.  In  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  by  George  Washington's  rules  and 
etiquette,  they  took  precedence  below  the  senate ;  the  extent  of  power, 
the  duration  of  office,  the  amount  of  salary,  and  the  avidity  with  which 
the  position  is  sought  by  the.  eminent  talent  of  the  country,  enter  inti- 
mately into  the  title  to  rank  and  precedence.  The  rank  was  so  decided. 
But  now  in  our  government  it  has  become  a  matter  of  serious  doubt. 
Our  president  holds  for  six  years — our  ministers  for  life,  and  they  are 
authorized  to  be  admitted  to  the  floors  of  congress  with  full  voice  in 
debate.  I  sec  them  now,  six  in  number,  entering  the  senate  with  formal 
air  and  ceremonious  reserve,  followed  by  their  clerks  with  the  official 
portfolio,  great  rolls  of  records  and  red  tape,  and  seating  themselves  in 
selected  seats  specially  provided,  with  their  high  salaried  attendants  by 
their  sides,  and  I  see  flitting  around  them  an  obsequious  majority  of  the 
senate ;  and  I  see  a  senate  subjugated  and  lost  to  its  high  place  in  the 
government  of  the  country. 

After  this  conjunction  of  departments  in  the  constitutional  programme, 
this  official  hybridity,  there  will  be  no  question  of  precedence  to  be 
justly  entertained.  The  cabinet  "  life  oligarchy  "  must  rank  next  to 
the  president.  The  union  of  the  executive  with  the  legislative  depart- 
ments in  the  constitution,  seems  clearly  designed,  though  not  happily, 
to  reduce  this  government  to  the  English  system,  and  it  is  justly  to  be 
feared  that  it  has  been  overdone.  The  judiciary  may  have  to  protect 
2 


10 

the  public  rights,  whilst  the  house  of  representatives,  not  only  unaided, 
but  actually  embarrassed  by  a  stupifiecl  and  subjugated  senate,  may  have 
to  rescue  public  liberty  from  a  system  far  more  despotic  than  the  English. 
There,  the  house  of  commons  can  turn  out  a  ministry ;  but  here,  never  ! 

The  spirit  of  the  constitution  is  invoked  to  confer  office  for  life — upon 
whom  ?     Upon  the  highest  class  of  officers  known  to  the  government. 

The  secretaries  have  power,  and  a  vast  deal  of  it,  legal  and  lawless. 
They  have  far  more  than  a  judge  or  a  member  of  the  house  or  senate. 
Their  offices  are  sought  for  with  avidity ;  they  are  the  high  objects  of 
the  ambition  of  our  most  eminent  orators,  legislators  and  statesmen. 
They  command  the  highest  class  of  able  statesmen  and  sharp-sighted 
politicians. 

It  is  not  proper  to  invoke  a  spirit  from  the  charter  of  liberty,  to  es- 
tablish office  for  life  upon  this  great  and  dangerous  class  of  pensioners 
u  at  the  will  of  the  president  "  They  will  soon  become  too  strong  for 
subordination  to  law  and  the  security  of  personal  rights.  It  is  impos- 
sible the  president  can  desire  a  system  which  will  defeat  his  high  objects 
and  damn  his  great  labors. 

The  report  of  the  committee,  pp.  5  and  6,  establishes  in  this  connec- 
tion an  invaluable  fact,  to  wit :  "  that  the  insertion  of  the  removal  clause 
in  our  constitution,  (par.  3,  sec.  2,  art.  2,)  was  intended  to  settle  a  grave 
constitutional  dispute  as  to  the  power  of  the  president  to  remove  an  ex- 
ecutive officer  without  the  concurrence  of  the  senate,  as  well  as  to 
restrain  him  in  the  exercise  of  that  power  as  to  all  the  civil  officers," 
except  the  heads  of  departments  and  the  diplomatic  corps.  But  for  this 
explanation  it  might  be  inferred  and  would  be  argued,  that  the  true 
intent  of  the  removal  clause  was  not  only  to  give  to  the  president  the 
power  of  removal  "  at  pleasure"  and  "  at  any  time"  but  also  to  estab- 
lish a  personal  control  over  all  classes  of  his  appointees  so  complete,  as 
that  it  should  interdict  to  congress  the  right  to  limit  the  duration  of  an 
executive  officer. 

If  such  exclusive  control  had  been  designed,  it  would  have  been  de- 
clared, and  would  not  have  been  left  to  interpretation  and  inference. 
By  that  clause  the  executive  power  of  removal  is  placed  beyond  dispute, 
but  the  legislative  power  to  establish  a  term  of  years,  as  the  official  term 
was  not  destroyed.  The  report  of  the  committee  has  well  remarked, 
that  "  to  create  an  office  and  to  regulate  its  tenure  is  an  exercise  of 
legislative  power  ;  to  remove  an  officer  is  an  executive  act." 

It  may  be  justly  added,  that  the  first  and  paramount  "  spirit  of  the 
constitution"  is  that  of  limitation  upon  powers  otherwise  absolute  in 
character  and  unrestricted  in  duration. 

The  president  shall  be  thirty-five  years  old,  and  can  hold  office  but 
for  six  years,  and  is  not  re-eligible.  He  is  subjected  to  a  number  of 
other  conditions. 

The  vice-president  may  become  president,  and  would  seem  to  be  sub- 
ject to  all  the  same  restrictions  and  conditions. 

The  judges  of  the  confederate  courts  are  limited  to  "good  behavior" 
as  the  official  term. 

The  senator  shall  be  a  citizen,  shall  be  not  less  than  thirty  years  old7 
and  his  official  term,  is  six  years. 


11 

The  representative  shall  be  a  citizen,  not  less  than  twenty-five  years 
old,  and  his  official  term  is  two  years. 

Upon  other  officers  there  is  no  limitation  ;  but  it  is  to  be  remarked 
that  the  constitution,  whilst  it  authorizes,  does  not  create  any  other 
office.  No  other  officers  have  existence,  except  at  the  discretion  and  by 
the  creation  of  the  legislative  power,  and  the  legislative  power  is  en- 
dowed with  all  authority  in  clause  18,  sec.  8,  art.  1,  and  in  clause  2, 
sec.  2,  art.  2,  to  create  and  establish  the  offices  to  be  enjoyed,  and  is 
invested  with  full  and  complete  power,  since  no  limit  is  prescribed,  over 
the  duties,  attributes  and  constituent  features  of  such  officers.  There  is 
in  fact  no  office  created  by  the  constitution,  whose  duty  and  powers  are 
essential  to  the  system,  and  are  defined,  and  whose  existence  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  legislative  will,  to  which  the  constitution  has  not  affixed 
a  specific  duration  with  the  exception  of  the  judiciary,  and  in  that  case 
the  exception  is  expressly  declared  and  is  for  manifest  reasons.  From 
these  facts,  if  it  be  not  allowable  to  sa>,  that  the  "  spirit  of  the  consti- 
tution" requires  that  the  duration  of  high  offices  shall  be  limited,  it  is 
at  least  conclusive  that  the  spirit  of  the  constitution  interposes  no  ob- 
stacle to  limitation,  but  leaves  the  question  as  one  of  policy  to  be  de- 
termined by  the  law  making  power. 

Upon  the  conduct,  management  and  business  of  this  war  alone,  this 
measure  is  of  incalculable  consequence  in  the  new  spirit  and  vigor  it 
will  impart  generally  to  the  public  serviee,  whether  it  result  in  immedi- 
ate change  of  any  of  its  officers  or  not.  But  there  is  ground  to  appre- 
hend that  through  all  our  future,  the  steady  efficiency  of  the  govern- 
ment itself  is  involved,  and  that  its  powers  and  machinery  have  been 
distured  and  lost  balance  through  the  instrumentality  of  constitutional 
innovations,  and  that  the  tranquility  of  the  country  and  happiness  of 
the  people  may  be  dependent  for  a  check  or  guard  upon  this  or  some 
kindred  measure.  Our  constitution  is  not  the  same  with  that  to  which 
we  have  been  so  long  accustomed.  It  is  believed  to  be  far  better ;  but 
it  is  certainly  widely  different,  and  to  that  extent  is  an  experiment  de- 
manding thoughtful  observation  and  carefully  guarded  administration. 
The  views  here  submitted  upon  those  changes  and  amendments  in  our 
constitution,  are  submitted  with  all  humility,  believing  they  may  have  at 
least  the  merit  of  suggestiveness.  That  I  have  given  any  thought  at 
this  time  to  these  very  serious  questions  and  have  risked  its  expression, 
is  the  result  of  a  determined  will  to  remove  as  far  as  possible  all  ob- 
stacles, and  to  enlist  every  power  and  every  auspicious  influence  to  the 
promotion  of  our  speedy  triumph. 

To  this  end  it  is  believed  that  this  measure  is  essential  in  order  that 
we  may  bring  fresh  energies,  new  thoughts  and  the  highest  efficiency  to 
the  administration  of  any  one  of  these  departments,  in  which  if  we  have 
them  not  already,  all  must  admit  they  are  now  of  incalculable  impor- 
tance. 

But  as  the  opponents  of  this  policy  have  seemed  to  rely  almost  en- 
tirely on  constitutional  obstacles,  (thus  abandoning  most  unjustly  for 
some  of  the  secretaries  all  claim  to  any  superior  efficiency  of  depart- 
mental administration,)  the  friends  of  the  measure  are  driven  to  the  con- 
sideration of  those  obstacles,  and  the  constitution  itself,  rather  than  to 


12 

that  great  immediate  expediency  which  is  enforced  by  the  present  emer- 
gency. 

The  consideration,  therefore,  of  the  new  and  unsettled  features  of  the 
constitution,  and  their  effects  taken  severally  and  collectively  upon  our 
government,  is  wholly  unavoidable  ;  not,  however,  that  more  than  a 
sketch  is  now  pretended.  Yet,  in  the  course  of  it,  a  strong  conviction 
will  arise  with  many,  that  there  exists  danger  that  our  system  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  powers  has  been  unbalanced  and  that  guards  are  needed  to 
be  furnished  from  legislation  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  government. 

By  some  it  is  not  believed  that  the  convention  which  framed  this  con- 
stitution, fully  appreciated  at  the  time  the  vast  magnitude  of  the  changes 
made  by  them  upon  the  old  constitution,  which  had  successfully  with- 
stood faction  and  fanaticism,  and  preserved  its  machinery,  form,  shape 
and  system  over  seventy  years,  or  they  would  have  thrown  around  those 
innovations,  by  express  provisions,  additional  guards. 

The  intent  of  the  convention  is  apparent  from  its  work.  It  was  to 
strike  out  an  intermediate  system  of  a  government  between  those  of 
England  and  the  United  States — avoiding  the  monarchy  and  titled  aris- 
tocracy of  the  first,  and  the  frequent  recurring  elections,  factious  con- 
vulsions and  restless  instability  of  the  last.  The  danger  now  is,  not  that 
we  shall  fall  into  either  of  those  systems,  but  into  one  that  has  vices 
from  which  both  the  others  have  escaped,  and  under  which  we  may  be 
most  disastrously  entrapped. 

In  the  meanwhile,  to  preserve  the  constitution  in  its  essential  guaran- 
tees of  popular  government  until  peace  gives  opportunity  for  a  reform, 
is  a  paramount  object ;  and  to  this  end  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten,  that  as 
this  government  shall  have  asserted  either  its  powers  or  'prerogatives  and 
have  been  trained  to  its  work  by  the  present  executive,  so  is  it  likely  to 
continue  in  the  hands  of  his  successors,  of  whom  we  cannot  always 
expect  the  same  unbounded  patriotism  or  even  the  same  self-denial  and 
.forbearance  in  its  administration,  as  we  can  from  him  whose  glory  it 
more  especially  is  to  be  its  author  and  ruling  spirit. 

His  fame  and  influence  hereafter  must  be  counted  and  considered. 
The  birth  of  this  republic,  in  the  midst  of  the  mighty  throes  which  have 
convulsed  the  continent  and  distressed  a  world,  bounding  at  a  leap  across 
dangers  so  fearful,  full  armed  into  the  arena  of  nations,  the  unconquer- 
able competitor,  if  not  the  equal  of  the  greatest  of  the  family — the  crea- 
tion of  a  great  and  independent  nationality,  in  the  face  of  such  a  war, 
and  in  despite  of  the  great  wrongs  of  a  treacherous  and  pusilanimous 
neutrality  on  the  part  of  an  unfriendly  world — the  character  of  the 
government  itself — the  prosperity,  happiness  and  greatness  of  its  people — 
all  will  go  to  establish  the  rank  of  Jefferson  Davis  amongst  the  most 
remarkable  and  renowned  men  of  any  age.  Immaterial  whether  all 
think  he  deserve  it  or  not :  no  man  of  sense,  after  calmly  reflecting, 
will  deny  it.  The  overflowing  confidence  and  affection  of  this  people 
will  attend  him  through  life.  This  will  be  the  natural  reward  of  great 
and  patriotic  labors  and  painful  responsibilities.  Success  will  perfect 
his  title,  and  it  will  be  sound  and  enduring.  He  alone  can  abridge  or 
enlarge  this  award  of  posterity,  by  his  wisdom  and  statesmanship,  or  by 


His  influence,  then,  upon  the  opinions  of  our  people,  and  upon  the 
nature  and  machinery  as  well  as  policy  of  our  government,  will  be  al- 
most certain  to  predominate.  These  facts  he  must  recognize  ;  they  re- 
double his  responsibilities,  and  require  of  him  the  wisdom  of  a  great 
statesman  and  self-denial  of  a  great  philosopher.  As  his  co-laborers, 
we  are  forced  to  recollect  that  his  practice  hereafter  is  to  constitute  pre- 
cedent— his  dictum,  decision — his  naked  word  is  to  assume  the  force  of 
solemn  warrant.  Errors  originated,  tolerated  or  cherished  by  him,  will 
fuse  and  consolidate  in  our  system.  Let  us  then  be  warned  and  ob- 
servant. 

Every  guard  ought  to  be  secured  during  his  term  that  is  essential.  No 
one  more  readily  than  he  will  recognize  these  truths,  and,  as  I  believe, 
sympathize  with  them. 

After  his  term,  no  cardinal  organic  change  even  to  abridge  executive 
license  and  impunity  will  be  allowed  by  his  successors,  but  through  the 
ordinary  channel  of  violent  party  conflict;  and  to  this  obstacle  to  reform 
is  to  be  superadded  that  of  a  concurrence  in  sueh  reform  on  the  part  of 
our  exaggerated  state  sovereignties.  These  state  sovereignties  arc  new 
and  untried  instruments  of  stubborn  power.  I  look  upon  them  in  this 
connection  with  great  apprehension.  When  they  shall  be  invoked  in 
conflict  upon  constitutional  questions  and  a  president  shall  head  the;', 
ral  party  in  opposition  to  popular  or  states'  rights  element,  which  is 
almost  inevitable,  it  will  rack  this  Confederacy  sorely. 

But  far  more  ominous  is  it  of  our  disaster  when  these  sovereignties 
shall  have  become  usual  elements  in  our  ordinary  political  conflicts  ;  and 
it  is  idle  to  hope  that  ambitious  men  will  not  lead  them  into  it. 

By  the  innovations  in  our  constitution,  the  presidential  office  has  been 
greatly  elevated. 

To  appoint  each  successor  is  to  become  an  object  of  fearful  struggle 
between  the  incumbent,  the  state  sovereignties  and  geographical  sec- 
tions it  is  to  be  feared. 

But  the  Office  will  certainly  increase  in  dignity  and  splendor  with  its 
growth  in  power  and  duration,  and  with  the  freedom  of  the  subordinates 
from  the  checks  and  restrictions  of  law. 

The  government  will  assuredly  shake  off  its  respect  for  public  interest 
and  popular  opinion  to  the  extent  that  it  has  been  shorn  of  the  hopes  of 
further  promotion,  and  relieved  of  that  dependence  upon  the  people  in- 
volved in  a  re-election,  whilst  it  is  likely  to  be  only  the  more  resolved 
to  appoint  its  own  successor.  I  will  not  say  that  the  presidential  office 
has  outgrown  our  system  ;  but  I  will  say  of  our  future  history,  that 
every  occupant  after  Jefferson  Davis,  will  feel  this  growth  and  reflect  it, 
in  the  style,  the  manners  and  the  ceremonies  of  the  court,  and  ultimately 
in  the  improvident  and  reckless  administration  of  the  government. 

One  proposition  would  seem  to  be  plain,  to  wit :  that  it  will  not  do  to 
surround  this  presidential  office,  as  now  constituted,  with  a  cabinet  com- 
posing an  oligarchy  of  the  six  most  powerful  officers  of  government, 
who  shall  be  attached  as  mere  dependants,  commissioned  for  life,  re- 
movable "at  pleasure,"  with  or  without  cause, and  subjected  to  no  check, 
limitation  or   accountability,  other  than  the  judgment,  the  passion,  the 


14 

ambition  or  corruption  of  any  and  every  man  who  may  hereafter  chance 
to  be  elected  to  the  office  of  president. 

Heretofore  our  people  have  been  accustomed  to  a  plain  style  of  living ; 
to  republican  manners,  and  the  unassuming  simplicity  of  fraternity  and 
equality.  But  hereafter,  if  no  guard,  or  check,  or  accountability  shall 
be  interposed,  the  cabinet  will  become  the  government  in  fact,  the  presi- 
dential court  will  become  one  of  ceremony,  extravagance,  and  regal 
grandeur,  and  the  lesser  lights  and  satellites  will  rival  that  court  in  os- 
tentation, expenditure  and  pretension,  until  finally  their  folly  shall  cor- 
rupt public  manners,  threaten  our  political  rights,  and  force  the  states 
to  reform  the  system. 

The  picture  is  an  unpleasant  one;  but  I  feel  no  fear  of  injury  to  our 
great  cause,  whether  present  or  future,  fiom  this  discussion.  The  sub- 
ject, thank  God,  whilst  this  president  lasts,  is  yet  within  our  control, 
and  I  hope  and  trust  not  only  congress,  but  the  guardians  and  thought- 
ful men  of  our  state  governments  will  take  up  and  consider  the  remedies 
in  due  time,  even  to  the  extent  of  reforming  the  constitution  in  conven- 
tion. 

Our  constitution  enlarges  the  duration  of  the  official  term  of  a  presi- 
dent to  six  years,  and  limits  the  eligibility  to  one  term, 

The  United  States'  constitution  restricts  the  official  term  to  four  years, 
and  allows  without  limit  his  re-eligibility.  He  may  be  re-elected  any 
number  of  terms. 

By  our  constitution,  when  once  installed^  our  president  has  attained 
the  summit  of  honor — he  has  filled  the  measure  of  his  glory.  He  can 
indulge  no  further  legitimate  ambition  of  place  and  power.  He  has 
nothing  more  to  ask  for  or  to  hope.  His  ambition  is  fired — it  is  not 
quenched.  He  becomes  independent  of  popular  opinion ;  he  may  tread 
it  under  foot  as  he  pleases,  (and  we  all  know  the  frailty  of  man;)  he  may 
labor  hard  and  patriotically,  or  selfishly,  or  perfidiously  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  government,  or  he  may  turn  it  over  to  his  prime  minister 
and  devote  himself  to  a  life  of  luxury  and  enjoyment,  or  to  the  pageantry, 
magnificence,  extravagance  and  ceremonial  of  a  great  court.  It  is  a 
most  inviting  style  of  life  both  to  the  gentlemen  and  the  Jadies,  and  it 
lasts  for  all  of  six  years.  How  long  will  it  be  before  some  president 
will  adopt  all  this  ease,  stylo  and  dignity,  and,  like  other  potentates, 
conduct  his  government  by  his  prime  minister  and  his  principal  officers 
of  executive  departments  ?  Why  should  the  president  not  do  so  ?  Our 
system  invites  him  to  repose.  He  is  wholly  independent.  He  has 
labored  a  life-time  to  win  the  prize ;  why  encounter  six  more  long  years 
of  increased  trouble  and  perplexity  ?  He  is  cut  off  from  re-election. 
He  is  independent  of  the  love  and  the  hatred  of  the  people.  Why  not 
enjoy  it  ?  And  when  once  this  example  is  set,  our  political  institutions 
will  have  undergone  a  radical  change. 

He  who  does  not  perceive  that  this  is  a  possible  and  even  probable 
result  of  the  innovation  upon  the  presidential  tenure,  has  a  credulous 
nature  or  a  shallow  knowledge  of  human  kind.  The  forecast  would 
suggest  timely  guards. 

Not  to  consume  time,  I  will  barely  refer  to  what  must  be  familiar,  by 


15 

way  of  illustration,  as  showing  the  tendency  of  power  to  imperial  rules, 
princely  forms,  and  courtly  style  and  manners.  I  will  but  refer  to  our 
days  of  purest  men  and  patriots — to  the  period  of  the  administrations 
of  George  Washington  and  John  Adams — times  when  we  would  least 
expect  it.  The  style  of  those  courts  was  repugnant  to  the  people,  and 
their  tendency  more  and  more  to  forms,  style  and  assumptions  monar- 
chial,  until  the  opposition  and  elevation  of  Mr.  Jefferson  annihilated  the 
whole  courtly  fabric,  and  established  a  republican  simplicity  which  pre- 
vails to  the  present  day.  But  this  occurred  when  the  purest  patriots 
governed  and  the  purest  politicians  lived,  and  when  the  president  could 
hold  but  for  four  years,  and  when  he  was  capable  of  re-election  for  any 
number  of  terms,  and  actually  desired  the  re-election,  and  was  thus  all 
the  while  responsible  to  the  love  or  hatred  of  the  people,  and  dependent 
on  their  voice  of  praise  or  censure — dependent  on  their  votes.  It  can- 
not be  difficult  to  foresee  the  difference  in  results,  now  that  we  have  a 
ruler  for  six  years,  instead  of  four,  incapable  of  re-election,  disconnected 
and  wholly  independent  of  the  people. 

When  the  first  president  shall  have  thrown  from  his  shoulders  the 
cares  of  state,  it  will  be  upon  one  or  two  of  his  favorite  secretaries,  and 
this  will  then  be  a  different  system  of  government.  The  results  will 
probably  be  satisfactory  at  first.  The  vices  of  a  system  rarely  ever  ap- 
pear at  the  hands  of  its  authors — rarely  ever  develop  at  the  outset. 

But  it  may  be  safely  concluded,  that  with  rare  exceptions,  every  pre- 
sident elected  afterwards  will  accept  the  office,  regarding  it  as  a  settled 
feature,  that  it  is  his  right  to  labor  at  the  duties  of  government  when 
and  as  much  or  as  little  as  he  may  please,  and  to  assign  such  part  of 
them,  or  all,  as  he  may  determine,  to  whomsoever  may  be  his  favorite 
secretary  or  head  of  a  department.  The  government  will  then  change. 
The  people  will  elect  the  president,  who  will  elect  the  ruler,  and  the 
ruler  will  be  independent  of  the  people,  and  of  all  other  branches  of 
government,  and  for  life,  if  congress  wills  it. 

That  such  a  transfer  or  assignment  of  the  duties  and  the  powers  of 
administration  is  to  be  the  result,  there  are  many  other  reasons  and 
causes  naturally  arising  under  the  particular  innovation  now  under  con- 
sideration, to  which  time,  and  perhaps  your  patience,  will  not  allow 
present  reference  ;  but  a  reference  must  be  had  to  a  few  of  the  more 
prominent,  and  particularly  to  those  causes  and  influences,  the  result  of 
other  innovations  bearing  upon  the  postulate  of  the  transfer  by  the 
president  of  the  duties  of  administration  to  cabinet  officers,  which,  it  is 
believed,  will  be  decisive  in  their  effect  to  bring  out  that  result. 

Not  only  have  we  the  extension  of  the  presidential  term  to  six  years — 
the  inhibition  of  re- eligibility  after  that  term — the  latitudinary  con- 
struction of  the  constitution  to  the  effect  that  the  duration  of  the  tenure 
of  cabinet  executive  officers  shall  not  be  prescribed  by  congress — and 
its  corollary  that  the  duration  of  the  tenure  of  all  the  subordinate  ex- 
ecutive officers  is  placed  beyond  legislative  limitation — and  its  true,  but 
secondary  result,  the  hidden  meaning,  to  wit :  that  in  the  hands  of  the 
president  rests  the  appointing  power  to  all  executive  officers,  and  the 
power  of  removal  at  pleasure,  to  wit :  of  perpetuation  in  office  at  pleas- 
ure and  for  life,  since   there  is  to  be  no   other   legitimate  method  of 


16 

limiting  the  duration,  thus  rendering  hiiii  the  fountain  of  all  office,  and 
if  he  be  an  ambitious  and  corrupt  man,  thus  rendering  subservient  to 
him  and  his  designs,  whatever  they  may  be,  the  whole,  or  as  many  as  he 
may  wish  to  use  of  the  entire  official  corps,  civil  and  militaiy,  of  the 
Confederacy.  Not  only  have  we  all  this  in  the  enlargement  of  the  ex- 
ecutive power,  but,  as  if  it  were  not  enough,  we  have  still  another  inno- 
vation of  overwhelming  magnitude,  provided  in  the  2d  clause  of  the  6th 
section  of  the  1st  article,  where  it  is  declared  that  "congress  may  by 
law  grant  to  the  principal  officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments 
a  seat  upon  the  floor  of  either  house  of  congress,  with  the  privilege  of 
discussing  any  measures  appertaining  to  his  department." 

These  ministers  have  not  yet  taken  their  seats  in  congress.  But  every 
man  of  common  sense  knows  that  the  time  must  and  will  come  when  they 
will  take  their  seats  on  both  floors  of  congress.  Many  ^causes  will  serve 
to  produce  it — the  personal  supremacy  of  some  great  orator— the  great 
wisdom  of  some  profound  statesman,  or  public  benefactor — high  party 
excitement  still  more  likely — love  of  change — spirit  of  experimental- 
ism — even  a  legislative  freak — ma*ny  motives,  causes,  influences  and 
casualties  can,  and  some  will  concur,  to  seat  first  upon  one  and  then 
both  floors  of  congress  the  whole  executive  cabinet  corps. 

To  any  one  familiar  with,  and  experienced  in  legislative  proceedings, 
the  stupendous  power  of  this  provision  to  control,  direct  and  shape 
legislation  is  evident  at  once.  To  make  it  manifest  in  its  vast  and  al- 
most incalculable  proportions  and  influences,  is  a  task  worthy  of  the  .pen 
of  Madison,  Hamilton  or  Jefferson,  and  is  impossible  to  one  of  less  ca- 
pacity. -I  shall  therefore  be  content  if  I  can  only  effect  a  faint  con- 
ception ;  I  could  not  hope  to  do  more. 

I  am  aware  of  the  ruling  argument  in  its  favor,  I  believe ;  but  I  will 
leave  to  its  friends  to  state  it.  It  is  plausible,  and  under  some  circum- 
stances it  would  enable  a  legislative  body,  if  filled  with  men  of  such 
transcendent  powers  and  rigorous  nature  and  dominating  character  as 
Mr.  Clay,  Mr.  Benton,  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  perhaps  only  a  few  more  who 
have  lived  in  our  history,  te  crush  or  to  purify  a  corrupt  administration. 
But  such  men  are  rare,  and  even  they  could  not  triumph  if  confronted 
with  their  equals  in  the  elements  of  state  craft  and  personal  ascendancy. 

It  is  the  Trojan  horse;  the  outer  wall  established  in  the  old  constitu- 
tion was  torn  down  by  the  Montgomery  convention,  and  it  only  remains 
for  congress,  in  some  thoughtless  mood  of  unguarded  confidence  or  cre- 
dulity, to  introduce  it  in  the  city ;  it  is  filled  with  armed  men  ;  the  city 
will  be  betrayed,  its  gates  thrown  open,  and  congress,  the  citadel  of 
liberty  and  popular  good  government,  may  fall  beneath  the  false  and 
perfidious  legislation  which  will  be  planned  by  the*  mbitious  and  cor- 
rupt, and  enacted  under  the  influence  of  eloquence  over  the  weak,  threats 
on  the  timid,  bribes  to  the  corrupt,  and  the  unnumbered  agencies  which 
personal  association  aiid  a  seat  in  the  same  legislative  body  will  always 
confer  upon  the  man  who  holds  the  great  executive  powers,  augmented 
by  personal  ascendancy  and  greater  intellect.  The  judiciary  can  be 
crippled  by  legislation ;  the  congress  can  be  made  subservient — can 
prostitute  its  powers,  or  indirectly  destroy  them;  the  executive  can  be 
invested  with  every  power  requisite  to  tyranny  and  ambition,  and  all 


17 

without  violating  a  letter  of  the  constitution.  Those  who  make,  or  con- 
strue, or  execute  the  laws,  and  who  have  reasonable  experience  in  legis- 
lative and  executive  political  life,  know  how  easy  of  accomplishment  are 
these  propositions. 

The  experience  of  several  thousand  years,  during  which  we  are  fur- 
nished by  history  with  somewhat  of  the  efforts  and  experiments  by  all 
nations,  upon  all  classes  of  government,  all  serve  but  to  show  that  re- 
publics have  been  the  least  stable,  and  that  if  there  be  any  one  system 
of  liberty  and  self-government  capable  of  permanent  success,  it  is  that 
which  is  based  upon  a  guarded  system  of  representation  and  a  practical 
distinct  subdivision  and  separation  of  the  powers,  executive,  legislative 
and  judicial.  Yet  our  constitution  has  jumbled  together  the  executive 
and  legislative  departments.  If  it  shall  be  allowed  to  be  consummated, 
I  do  not  hesitate  to  assert,  that  it  will  prove  in  our  system,  which  is  so 
different  from  that  of  the  English,  to  which  alone  i  nee  made  to 

justify  the  innovation,  it  will  prove  to  be  a  deadly  blow  at  the  equality, 
the  purity,  and  the  independence  jof  the  legislative  department. 

This  innovation  has  n  ated  the  Executive  upon  the  floors  of  the 

Senate  and  House,  where  he  is  authorized  to  use  official,  social  and  per- 
sonal influences,  to  utter  his  persuasions,  or  to  denounce  his  fiat ;  but 
it  has  proposed  to  place  his  reserve  corps  upon  their  sacred  floors,  the 
six  highest  executive  officers  of  government,  his  instruments  holding  at 
pleasure,  to  represent  him  and  "  to  do  his  pleasure;"  agents  far  more 
able  and  effective  certainly  upon  this  theatre,  than  he  would  be,  and  se- 
lected with  that  view. 

This  innovation  has  created  an  OLIGARCHY,  and  hedged  around  with 
them  a  master,  and  not  the  people's  president.     The  sj  .  es  us  an 

oligarchy's  president,  and  a  president's  oligarchy.  I  feel  myself  on 
the  highway  to  humiliation,  whenever  my  duty  forces  me  to  call  on  one 
oligarch.  Though  to  do  justice  by  the  system  of  oligarchs,  I  feel  my- 
self honored  and  proud  of  the  respect  and  friendship  of  some  other 
''oligarchs;"  for  to  be  an  "oligarch"  is  not  essentially  to  cease  to  be  a 
faithful  officer  and  a  courteous,  proper  gentleman. 

This  innovation  has  created  a  corps  of  official  hybrids — neither  execu- 
tive nor  legislative — but  both.  Official  hybridity  and  hybridous  oligar- 
chy, and  oligarchal  democracy :  it  is  a  rare,  representative,  republican, 
constitutional  spawning.  There  is  a  genius  in  the  conception  ;  there  is 
originality  in  or  about  the  cabinet  institution,  or  there  was  about  the 
constitutional  profundity  of  hatching;  so  anomalous  and  vigorous  the 
hybridous,  long-lived  constitutions  of  this  extreme  oligarchical  circle. 

I  did  not  expect  this  brood  to  be  declared  by  old  state's  rights  repub- 
licans of  any  party,  under  any  rule  of  construction,  to  be  a  life  office 
oligarchy.  It  must  greatly  elevate  the  dignity,  power  and  seductive- 
ness of  the  commission.  A  leadership  in  congress  few  men  would  ex- 
change for  the  silent  though  ever  so  inflated  honors  of  a  cabinet.  But 
as  if  to  furnish  the  "  il  habet,"  the  last  blow  to  congress,  a  cabinet  ; 
is  made  by  this  mongrel  feature  to  insure  a  membership  and  ship 

not  in  one  but  in  both  houses  of  congress,  in  addition  to  all  the  other 
great  powers  and  distinctions,  and  that,  too,  for  life,  if  the  oligarchy 
and  their  life  office   subordinates,  their  official  tools,  can  only  elect  the 


18 

successive  presidents.  This  will  enable  every  president,  always,  with 
honorable  bid,  to  enlist  in  the  cabinet  council,  and  to  recruit  from  the 
halls  of  senate  and  house  all  the  evident  individual  ascendancy  that  is 
developed  in  either,  and  that  might  otherwise  prefer  patriotic  opposition 
to  official  subserviency. 

But  I  am  warned  by  the  length  of  this  address  that  it  is  proper  to 
conclude. 

I  cannot  do  so  however  without  stating  that  there  are  other  most  ma- 
terial considerations  I  would  desire  to  present,  and  yet  I  presume  they 
will  be  better  presented  by  others  ;  and  particularly  the  enquiry  as  to 
the  character  and  extent  and  explicitness  of  the  confirmation  of  these 
cabinet  officers,  and  the  proper  language  of  their  commissions  in  obe- 
dience thereto.     It  is  a  matter  of  just  enquiry  now. 

But  above  all,  I  regret  that  I  cannot  now,  though  I  may  hereafter  take 
occasion,  to  enter  the  broad  field  of  the  immediate  expediency  of  this 
measure.  Exclusive  of  the  fact,  that  the  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment can  never  leave  the  president  and  go  into  the  hands  of  unelected 
and  irresponsible  departmental  officers,  if  this  bill  is  enacted,  besides 
other  great  and  most  weighty  considerations,  which  I  am  not  now  able 
to  sum  up,  in  connection  with  the  justice,  wisdom  and  purity  of  govern- 
ment. Yet  all  may  safely  conclude,  that  if  the  offices  of  the  ministry 
shall  periodically  expire,  it  will  at  least  result  in  that,  which  of  all 
others  is  by  far  the  most  desirable  at  present,  in  constant  and  faithful 
labor  in  office,  and  in  the  utmost  energy  and  efficiency. 

In  conclusion,  I  may  say  that  I  have  seen  indications  of  a  disposition, 
to  regard  this  measure  as  a  party  movement,  and  perhaps  extending  so 
far  even  as  to  indicate  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  its  opponents  to  force 
it  to  that  result.  If  this  be  so,  I  say  nothing  yet  as  to  what  would  seem 
to  be  the  prompting  motive ;  but  I  will  say,  that  so  far  as*  I  am  con- 
cerned, such  suspicion,  if  really  entertained,  is  unfounded ;  and  any  such 
charge,  if  really  made,  is  false.  I  regard  these  innovations  on  the  presi- 
dential tenure,  and  the  cabinet  institution,  as  now  construed  in  and  un- 
der our  constitution,  as  being  defective  and  the  weakest  part  of  our  sys- 
tem ;  and  I  do  not  believe  that  all  the  powers  and  talent  of  this  cabinet 
are  faithfully  exerted,  nor  that  the  essential  spur  is  yet  applied  to 
force  it. 

But  as  to  this  being  an  opposition  party  movement,  whilst  I  cannot 
be  a  follower  of  any  cabinet  officer,  or  other  subordinate,  that  I  be- 
lieve either  unfit  or  incompetent,  I  am  free  to  say  that  I  desired  and 
sought  frankly  to  converse  with  the  president  beforehand  on  this  matter, 
but  had  to  give  it  up,  and  trust  to  his  sound  and  discriminating  judg- 
ment to  read  me  and  my  motives  truly  :  and  also  to  say,  that  whilst  this 
war  lasts,  it  is  not  possible  I  can  be  driven  to  sympathize  with  any  party 
opposition  organization. 

With  President  Davis,  the  salvation  of  the  country  and  the  establish- 
ment of  a  durable  and  efficient  republican  government,  I  am  satisfied, 
is  the  one  all  engrossing  and  superlative  desire.  The  motive  is  the 
same  with  many  who  are  connected  with  him  in  their  public  duties,  and 
they  (myself  of  the  number)  may  not  always  pursue  that  course,  which 
would  most   entirely  conform  to  what  would  be  consistent  either  with 


19 

his  judgment  or  feeling.  And  for  one,  I  cannot,  so  long  as  my  judg- 
ment shall  be  able,  with  reasonable  strength  of  conviction  to  direct  me, 
I  will  not,  "seeing  the  right,  still  the  wrong  pursue." 


Date  Due 


pewruLiffc* 

PH8.5 


